Why electronic signatures stop validating, and how to keep them provable

Take a contract signed with a qualified electronic signature in 2019 and validate it today. There is a fair chance the result is not “valid” but INDETERMINATE. Nobody touched the file, and the signature still verifies mathematically. What is missing is the evidence around it: the certificates, revocation data and trusted lists that showed, back then, that the signer’s certificate was genuine and in force.

Indeterminate does not mean forged or invalid. It means the validator cannot confirm the signature either way. In a dispute that is still a problem, because whoever relies on the signature now has to fill the gap. This post explains why it happens, what validators report when it does, and the three ways to keep a signature provable for decades.

What a validator actually checks

European validators follow ETSI EN 319 102-1, the procedure implemented by the European Commission’s EU DSS library. Simplified, a signature passes when:

  1. the signature value matches the signed data and the signer’s public key;
  2. a certificate chain leads from the signer to a trust anchor (for EU qualified signatures, a service on an EU trusted list);
  3. the signing certificate was valid and not revoked when the signature was made, shown by an OCSP response or a CRL;
  4. the algorithms and key lengths used are still considered secure;
  5. for a qualified signature, the issuer was qualified at signing time.

Only the first check depends on the file alone. Everything else depends on information held outside it, which is true at one point in time, and that information changes.

Four things that change while the file does not

Certificates expire

Signing certificates are valid for a few years. Once one has expired, the validator needs to know the signature was made before that. The signing time in a basic signature is only the signer’s own claim, taken from their computer’s clock. Without a trusted timestamp from before the expiry date, nothing proves the signature is older than the certificate’s end.

Revocation data disappears

For qualified certificates, eIDAS requires the provider to keep answering status queries beyond the certificate’s validity (Article 24). But providers merge, stop operating or rebuild their infrastructure, and for non-qualified certificates there is no such duty. Revocation data you did not collect is data you are trusting someone else to still have in twenty years.

Trusted lists move on

Whether an issuer was qualified is read from the EU trusted lists. They record each service’s status history, but services are withdrawn, providers lose qualified status, and the keys that sign the lists are replaced. The signed list in force on the day is the most direct evidence of what was true that day.

Algorithms age

What is secure today is retired later. SHA-1 and 1024-bit RSA have already gone that way. Validators apply a catalogue of algorithms with expiry dates (ETSI TS 119 312 and national catalogues such as the BSI’s). Once an algorithm is past its date, a signature that uses it is no longer accepted on its own.

What the validator then says

What changedIndicationTypical sub-indication
The signing certificate has expiredINDETERMINATEOUT_OF_BOUNDS_NO_POE
Its revocation status can no longer be obtainedINDETERMINATEvaries by validator
An algorithm is past its expiry dateINDETERMINATECRYPTO_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE_NO_POE
The issuer can no longer be traced to a trusted listINDETERMINATENO_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FOUND

The names come from ETSI EN 319 102-1 as EU DSS reports them; other validators word them differently. Note the suffix on two of them: NO_POE, “no proof of existence”. That is the key to the whole problem. Each case is solved the same way: evidence that the signature and its validation data existed at a time when everything was still valid, plus a way to carry that evidence forward for as long as the signature matters.

Three ways to keep the evidence

1. Inside the signature: long-term formats

The AdES signature formats have levels for this. B-T adds a timestamp, B-LT adds the validation data (certificates, OCSP responses, CRLs) to the signature, and B-LTA adds archive timestamps that have to be applied again before the previous one’s certificate expires or its algorithm weakens. In a PDF (PAdES), the validation data goes into the document’s Document Security Store and the archive timestamps are document timestamps.

The result is self-contained, but the file has to be modified at every renewal, and every file has to be renewed on its own. Copies kept elsewhere fall behind, and one missed renewal breaks the chain. Many signing workflows also produce only B-B or B-T, so the validation data was never captured in the first place.

2. Beside the signature: evidence records

An RFC 4998 evidence record keeps the proof outside the file. The signatures and validation data are hashed, many objects go into one hash tree, and a single timestamp covers the tree’s root. Before that timestamp’s certificate expires or its algorithm weakens, the record is renewed with a new timestamp, or a new hash tree if the hash algorithm itself is ageing.

The signed file is never touched, and one timestamp covers thousands of files. It is the approach of BSI TR-03125 (TR-ESOR), Germany’s technical guideline for preserving the evidential value of signed documents. The cost is that someone has to keep renewing it for decades, and that the evidence record and the original file must be kept together.

3. A preservation service

eIDAS Article 34 defines a qualified preservation service for qualified electronic signatures (Article 40 applies it to seals): a qualified trust service provider that uses procedures and technologies able to extend the trustworthiness of the signature beyond its technological validity period. ETSI TS 119 511 sets out how such a service works; our ETSI TS 119 511 explainer walks through its terms. A service can follow the same standard without being qualified. The difference is supervision and a listing on the EU trusted list, so ask any vendor which one they are.

What to do now

  1. Find out what you have. Validate a sample of your signed files with the EU DSS demo validator and note their level: B-B, B-T, B-LT or B-LTA.
  2. Collect validation data soon after signing, while OCSP responders and CRLs still answer.
  3. Put a qualified timestamp over the signature and its validation data. That is the proof of existence the NO_POE cases are missing.
  4. Plan the renewal and decide who will do it for the next ten or thirty years.
  5. Keep the original file. Except for B-LTA, the evidence sits beside the file, and evidence without the file proves nothing.
  6. Make sure you can verify without the vendor: standard formats, offline.

One limit applies to every approach: preservation cannot bring back evidence that is already gone. A signature whose certificate expired years ago without a timestamp stays indeterminate. The earlier you start, the more there is to keep.

How TrustBeat Signature Preservation does it

Signature Preservation combines approaches 2 and 3:

  • The trustbeat-signature extractor reads the signed file on your machine and sends only its signatures and the digests that bind them to it. TrustBeat never receives the document.
  • On the day, each signature is validated with EU DSS, and the result is recorded as found, valid or not. TrustBeat records; it does not judge.
  • The certificates, OCSP responses and CRLs of that day, and the signed EU trusted lists in force, are kept with it in a Preservation Evidence Object.
  • That object gets an RFC 4998 evidence record on an eIDAS-qualified timestamp from SK ID Solutions or EuroCert, renewed before it expires, for 30 years.
  • You can download the package at any time and verify a file offline, without TrustBeat.

The service is designed to ETSI TS 119 511 (goal PDS, storage model WST). It is not a qualified preservation service and does not claim to be.

The short version

  • A signature can stop validating without any change to the file.
  • The causes are expired certificates, revocation data that is gone, trusted lists that moved on, and ageing algorithms.
  • Validators then report INDETERMINATE, often with “no proof of existence”.
  • The cure is a timestamped proof that the signature and its validation data existed while everything was valid, renewed for as long as it matters.
  • It has to be done in time: lost evidence cannot be recreated.

This post explains the technology and the regulation; it is not legal advice for your case. Signature Preservation starts at €19 a month. Evaluating it for your organisation? Ask for a free evaluation period.